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Context, rememberknow recognition judgements, and
ROC parameters
Salvador Algarabel and Alfonso Pitarque
University of Valencia, Spain
Recent work (e.g., Dunn, 2004; Heathcote, 2003) has questioned the necessity of postulating two
processes to explain recognition memory. As part of this trend, strength theories of the rememberknow
methodology have gained in support. We present three experiments with pictorial material in which we
force participants to use differential contextual information at test. Participants were required to give
rememberknow judgements and confidence ratings for each test stimulus. Hits, false alarms,
rememberknow data, and discrimination indices indicated systematic variations as a function of the
availability and use of contextual information. Moreover, when we normalised the receiver operating
characteristic data in terms of z -scores, the slopes were lower than 1 and slightly concave. Additionally,
we computed the same set of statistical indices suggested by Wixted and Stretch (2004), with mixed
results. Overall, we think that the data support a two-factor theory of rememberknow and recognition,
although many results fit well signal detection views of the task. Finally, the idea that remember and
know responses are pure manifestations of recollection and familiarity seems difficult to sustain. We
think that a productive use of the rememberknow methodology involves the minimisation of the bias
factors that may contaminate the responses, in addition to the introduction of the experimental
manipulations needed to promote recollective and/or familiarity processes.
We have all experienced the feeling of knowing
somebody because they look familiar to us
although we cannot identify the source of this
feeling. At other times a similar encounter elicits
a rich series of images of the previous occurrence.
In the recognition research literature both situa-
tions translate into a dispute between those who
defend the view that the data can be explained by
a single familiarity mechanism, and those who
propose a duality of familiarity and recollection
processes.
Traditional single-process views in their diverse
variants (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Gillund &
Shiffrin, 1984; Glanzer, Kim, Hilford, & Adams,
1999; Hilford, Glanzer, Kim, & DeCarlo, 2002;
Hintzman, 1984, 1986; Hirshman & Master, 1997;
Inoue & Bellezza, 1998; Murdock, 1974, 1982;
Pike, 1984; Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992;
Shiffrin & Steyvers, 1997; Xu & Bellezza, 2001)
analyse recognition performance from the point
of view of signal detection theory. All items
presented at test vary in the level of familiarity
they produce. The decision as to whether a
presented stimulus is categorised as new or old
depends on the result of the comparison between
the familiarity produced by the stimulus and a
reference criterion set by the participant.
By contrast, all dual models (Yonelinas, 2002)
view recognition as the product of a mixture of
familiarity and retrieval or recollection. Histori-
cally, the models of Atkinson and Juola (1974),
Mandler (1980), and Jacoby & Dallas (1981) are
Address correspondence to: Salvador Algarabel, Facultad de Psicologia, Universidad de Valencia, Blasco Ibanyez, 21 46010
Valencia, Spain. E-mail: Salvador.Algarabel@uv.es
This research was supported by Grant SEJ2004-02541 from The ‘‘Direccio´n General de Investigacio´n Cientı´fica y Te´cnica
(Spanish Ministry of Education and Technology’’).
We thank John T. Wixted for his thoughtful comments on an earlier version of this article.
# 2007 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
MEMORY, 2007, 15 (5), 477494
http://www.psypress.com/memory DOI:10.1080/09658210701312226
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 03
:44
 28
 M
ay
 20
15
 
well-known precursors, although the theory put
forward by Yonelinas (1994) and the dual views
born around the rememberknow (Tulving, 1985)
methodology have been the most influential.
Yonelinas’s model postulates that familiarity and
recollection are two qualitatively different cogni-
tive mechanisms involved in the generation of
specific evidence needed for a recognition deci-
sion. In this model, familiarity is described by a
signal detection model with equal variances,
which behaves in a way similar to the classical
analysis of recognition by traditional one-process
models. In contrast, recollection reflects an all-
or-none or threshold process whereby contextual
information about the study episode is retrieved,
and contributes to a decision. Both processes are
initiated in parallel, and their weight in the
recognition decision is dependent on a number
of factors, among which the testing conditions are
particularly relevant. Additional and relevant
characteristics include the fact that familiarity is
faster (e.g., Boldini, Russo, & Avons, 2004), and it
is assumed to support a wide range of confidence
responses, as opposed to recollection that sup-
ports mostly high-confidence decisions.
The Yonelinas model is a specific version of
the broad idea that there are two independent
sources of evidence contributing to recognition.
In this paper we link this broad, general two-
process idea to many researchers who use
the rememberknow methodology (Gardiner &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; Tulving, 1985) despite
not being formulated as a formal and more
specific model of recognition. One could argue
that this loose view of the two-process model is
identical to the signal detection model (see
Wixted & Stretch, 2004), in which a final decision
is taken based on the combined evidence. How-
ever, we think that if a different neural basis and
different behavioural properties may be linked to
the two postulated mechanisms, beyond simple
differences in criteria, then both points of view
should be treated separately.
In a rememberknow experiment, people are
asked whether they are able to recall peripheral
details associated with the target (remember
response) or simply if they judge that the target
stimulus was studied although they are not able
to place it in any specific context. Originally, both
types of judgements were intended to reflect
characteristics associated with episodic and se-
mantic memory, respectively. However, the divi-
sion between episodic and semantic memory is no
longer so clearly maintained, and the dichotomy
between remember and know recognition
responses has been taken as indicating dual
processes (Gardiner & Java, 1983), particularly
through the demonstration of functional dissocia-
tions between both types of judgements in rela-
tion with the influence of a number of variables
(see Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000).
According to this more contemporary view of
the rememberknow task, the responses reflect
the influence of recollection on the one hand and
familiarity in the absence of recollection on the
other, respectively. An alternative signal detec-
tion interpretation of the rememberknow data
has emerged (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004;
Hirshman & Master, 1997; Inoue & Bellezza,
1998; Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Xu & Bellezza,
2001), which sees remember responses as simply
indexing greater memory strength than know
responses, and categorised as such because their
memory strength surpasses a decision criterion
set by the participant.
The testing of these theories relies heavily on
the tools provided by signal detection theory, and
in the case of the rememberknow methodology
in the finding of experimental dissociations
between both response categories. In particular,
when hits (proportion of times that one correctly
identifies a studied item) are plotted against false
alarms (proportion of times that one incorrectly
identifies a novel stimulus as a studied one), a
receiver operating curve is obtained. Three para-
meters calculated from this basic function are of
special relevance to recognition memory theories:
its form when intact, and when transformed by a
z -normalisation (z -ROC), and the slope of the
z -transformed function. When the basic ROC
function is analysed its form is almost always
nonlinear, leading to the rejection of a whole
family of linear threshold models (see Murdock,
1974). Usually, the function is convex and asym-
metrical along the negative diagonal, as indicated
by a significant component of the quadratic
constant of the equation fitted to the data. All
models discussed in this paper either single or
dual, agree in this prediction. However, if the
ROC function is replotted in z-ROCs coordi-
nates, most single-process models would predict a
linear function, meaning a non-significant quad-
ratic component of the corresponding quadratic
equation. However, Yonelinas’s model predicts a
curvilinear z-ROC function when recollection is
present (Yonelinas, 1994). Therefore if the con-
dition that familiarity is governed by a signal
detection model with equal variances is to be held
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in the model, the z -ROC function must be
curvilinear. The fact that the slope of the z-
ROC functions is around 0.80 (Ratcliff et al.,
1992), means that the study phase leads to an
increase in dispersion of the familiarity values of
the corresponding items. This is so because the
slope of the z-ROC linear function is the ratio of
the new to the old standard deviations of the
respective distributions.
As indicated previously, those who defend dual
positions using the rememberknow methodol-
ogy do so arguing the independence of both types
of judgements given the large set of variables
showing dissociations between them (Gardiner &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). An important char-
acteristic of the methodology, and a weakness for
the critics, is that it is introspective in nature (see
Dunn, 2004; Inoue & Bellezza, 1998; Xu &
Bellezza, 2001). However, we think that the final
decision on the goodness of the rememberknow
(R/K) procedure depends on the evidence avail-
able in favour of the existence of different
determinants for both types of responses, and
the demonstration that the dissociations found in
the literature cannot be explained by a single
process.
With regard to the first aspect, the determi-
nants of remember and know judgements remain
largely unexplored (Hicks, Marsh & Ritschel,
2002; Java, Gregg & Gardiner, 1997; Perfect,
Mayes, Downes & van Eijk, 1996). Perfect et al.
(1996) asked their participants about memories of
spatio-temporal contextual details (word order,
quadrant in which it was originally written,
changes in typeface and size, and so on) system-
atically presented and manipulated in the study
phase. They found that people were able to
provide more details when they made a remem-
ber judgement than when they said they knew. In
the latter case, participants were also able to
provide a certain level of contextual information,
although in lesser amounts. These researchers
also realised that the accuracy of the contextual
information people had was quite low (see also
Hicks et al., 2002).
However, a recent paper by Dudukovic and
Knowlton (2006) has shown that the number of
episodic details is more clearly associated with
remember responses, and a long retention inter-
val produces a change from remember to know,
accompanied by decrease in contextual details. In
one of our previous papers (Algarabel, Pitarque
& Gotor, 2006), we also showed a change from
remember to know judgements as a function of
retention interval. Reder, Donavos, and Erickson
(2002) have also shown that the matching of font
type between study and test produced better
recognition and remember responses than mis-
matches or the use of less distinctive fonts.
Finally, Macken (2002) has observed that chan-
ging context between study and test affected
recollection, but not familiarity, although there
was no certainty that people were not using
overall familiarity in responding. These demon-
strations do not prove either of the two theore-
tical points of view that we are discussing,
but could be taken into account as supporting
evidence in favour of acceptance of the existence
of two mechanisms for recognition.
More recently, however, Rotello, Macmillan,
Reeder, and Wong (2005) have questioned the
viability of the procedure used regularly in
rememberknow experiments. They identified
two different set of instructions used in the
literature, and categorised them as conservative
(as in Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal,
& King, 1996) and liberal (as in Rajaram, 1996).
When they measured simultaneously confidence
judgements and rememberknow responses
under both sets of instructions, they observed
that hits and false alarms varied accordingly, and
more important, that signal detection theories
could provide a better account of the data. The
fact that introspective judgements are subject to
bias is understandable, but the question remains
whether the procedure is able to capture the basic
mechanisms of recognition under circumstances
in which people have sufficient opportunities to
recollect. This is the case in Dudukovic and
Knowlton’s paper (2006) in which participants
were exposed to rich pictorial elements as part of
the procedure. Nevertheless this is an open
question, of particular importance given the
criticisms of Rotello et al. (2005).
The second previously mentioned problematic
aspect of the R/K procedure has to do with recent
claims by single-process proponents (e.g., Dunn,
2004) that the dissociations found in the R/K
procedure do not provide unequivocal support for
two-process theories. In particular, Dunn (2004)
has shown convincingly that the results obtained
in a large compilation of experiments with regard
to those arguments could also be predicted from a
signal detection model with equal variances. It is
also important to point out that the analysis
brought about by Dunn does not try to explain
simultaneously critical data not obtained with the
R/K procedure. To this category belongs the need
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to provide an account of the values of the slopes
of the z-ROC functions, usually around 0.80,
incompatible with the signal detection model
with equal variances. In conclusion, current
research has shed some doubts on the validity
of the rememberknow methodology and the
corresponding dual views, based on the apparent
contamination of the data by criterion issues, and
the possible alternative explanation by signal
detection models of the dissociation experiments.
The main motivation for the current series of
experiments is to assess the one- and two-process
interpretations of the rememberknow proce-
dure, and to evaluate the methodology itself as
a valuable tool to analyse recognition. Although
the neurophysiological experimentation shows an
overwhelming support for the two-process view of
recognition (see a recent review in Aggleton &
Brown, 2006), there has been a progressive trend
in the behavioural literature to show increased
support for the signal detection view (e.g., Dunn,
2004; Heathcote, 2003; Wixted & Stretch, 2004),
and its interpretation of the results obtained with
the rememberknow methodology. We believe
that this is due to the susceptibility of the task to a
number of extraneous factors, besides those
cognitive processes directly involved in recogni-
tion (e.g., Rotello & Macmillan, 2006; Rotello
et al., 2005). Therefore, in the experiments that
follow we try to require the use of contextual
evidence to have a chance of getting a correct
response. In addition, we expect that this influ-
ence in objective discrimination translates into
the subjective judgements, giving clues to the
validity of the R/K procedure. Finally, we use
ROC parameters to determine whether this
influence can be subsumed under a single variable
or is the result of two different processes. We do
not subscribe to the view that recollection is
always used in an item recognition experiment
(see Diana, Reder, Arndt, & Park, 2006) as a
necessary part of a general two-process view, but
assume that encoding and testing conditions
establish its use to varying degrees.
In the three experiments we describe below, we
use real-world scenes as stimuli and we look for
independent evidence that remember and know
responses reflect two independent processes. The
reason is that pictures are complex and rich
stimuli in which all parts are coherently inter-
related. When one is confronted with a partial or
degraded view of a previously seen scene, and this
is the rule when we have a mental image from a
past event in mind, it is very likely that one has to
use a recall to confirm or similar strategy to aid in
the decision. This is in opposition to the situation
in which one sees a stimulus originally presented
with an impoverished non-interactive context
(see Baddeley, 1982; Murnane, Phelps, & Malm-
berg, 1999), which may render it useless as a cue
for retrieval. The use of pictorial stimuli in testing
one- versus two-factor accounts of recognition is
not new (e.g., Chandler, 1994; Dobbins, Kroll &
Liu, 1998), although our approach is different, as
we are trying to address some of the concerns
elicited by recent signal detection approaches
(e.g., Dunn, 2004).
We present three experiments with very similar
logic; namely to manipulate the test stimulus in
such a way that a participant has to explicitly use
different degrees of contextual information to
confirm or reject the test stimulus. We define ‘‘the
context’’ of an item as the encoding aspects or
operations carried out at study and stored in
memory, not physically present at test, but that
can help in the recognition decision. In the first
experiment, we define a sizeable portion of a
picture as ‘‘context’’ and the remaining part as the
study item. At test, only the latter is presented. It
is obvious that there are many other dimensions
of the study situation that are not directly under
our control but that may also play a role (mental
images, etc.). However, we expect that our ‘‘con-
textual manipulation’’ overshadows those other
possible functional factors not directly manipu-
lated. The design of the second experiment is
identical to the first one, except for the increment
in the time interval between ‘‘context’’ and
‘‘study item’’ at presentation time. In the third
experiment, presentation is identical for all parti-
cipants; that is, they see complete photographs,
but at test time some people recognise them on
the basis of the whole stimulus and others on a
small portion of the original photograph. We
predict that all conditions in which the test
stimulus is a partial representation of the original
picture, or there exists the possibility of using the
‘‘context’’ presented at study in the recognition
phase, will lead to heavier use of retrieval
mechanisms than those in which the stimulus is
identical in both cases, and also to a higher level
of recognition. The additional question of interest
is whether those retrieval mechanisms brought
into play contribute as a unique entity (one-
process theories) or not (two-process theories)
to recognition. With these goals in mind we also
required a subjective judgement (remember or
know) and a confidence in the yesno response.
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In this way we will analyse the objective data
(proportion correct or discriminability indices),
subjective judgements, and ROC parameters
obtained from the confidence responses.
Data analysis will be carried out looking at the
different proportions of responses partitioned
by type of judgement, and their relations to
confidence (see Wixted & Stretch, 2004). Very
recently, Wixted and Stretch have put together a
compelling set of arguments in favour of the
detection model based on new analyses of the
rememberknow data. We will present a similar
set of analyses for the present data, although we
were not aware of Wixted and Stretch’s approach
at the time we planned and ran our experiments.
In particular, Wixted and Stretch (2004) centred
most of their analyses on the relation of false
alarms with other parameters calculated from the
data, claiming that the signal detection view is
uniquely supported by data analyses carried out
on them. We will present the results obtained
from our experiments based on the idea that false
alarms can also be subject to illusory recollective
processes.
We will also analyse key ROCs parameters,
relating them to the rest of the data. Specifically,
we will look at three parameters: the curvature
of the untransformed ROCs and the linearity
and slope of the z-ROCs. According to past
analysis (Hilford et al., 2002; see also Heathcote,
2003), ROCs must be curvilinear if the under-
lying mechanism is not threshold based. On the
other hand, the z-ROCs would be nonlinear if
Yonelinas’s dual model is correct, and linear
according to signal detection based alternatives.
Although the different models can be accommo-
dated to explain apparently contradictory results,
the presence of a nonlinear quadratic component
in the standardised data is associated with the
use of recollection, according to Yonelinas’s
model. An additional specific point of his theory
is that it cannot predict the simultaneous pre-
sence of a significant quadratic constant and
a slope lower than 1 in the z-transformed data.
A final comparison of interest is between the
z -ROC slopes estimated from the confidence
ratings, and the same parameter from the re-
memberknow judgements. It has recently been
indicated (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004)
that if the signal detection model is correct, both
slopes should be equal. This prediction is similar
to that between discrimination calculated from
all data and from only the remember responses
(see Donaldson, 1996). Rotello et al. (2004) have
found that both slopes are different, with the one
estimated from the remember data not different
from 1, as in the source recognition literature
(e.g., Hilford et al., 2002). In this paper we will
have the opportunity to compare the z-ROC and
the two-point z -ROC slopes calculated from the
confidence and rememberknow data respec-
tively, obtained from the same data set. Given
that we will have the confidence and remember
know responses for the same set of stimuli, we
will carry out the same analyses that Wixted and
Stretch (2004) have carried out recently, trying to
generate new predictions on the relation be-
tween both variables from the point of view of
the signal detection model.
As in previous papers (Glanzer et al., 1999;
Hilford et al., 2002), we estimated the intercept
and slopes of z -ROC by maximum likelihood and
least square procedures for the group data. Given
that the correlations between both estimations
were 0.997 (intercepts) and 0.9983 (slopes) for
the seven conditions of our three experiments
(Hilford et al., 2002), we used least square
estimations throughout the paper because of their
convenience. All statistical fits were carried out
on the individual data, except the estimations
for the contrast between z-ROCr and global
z-ROCs.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants. The participants were 96 psychol-
ogy student volunteers at the University of
Valencia (Spain) who participated for extra
course credit. They were allocated randomly
into three groups of 32 participants.
Materials and apparatus. Two sets of 68 photo-
graphs of human and natural landscapes from
different parts of the world, taken by one of the
authors and closely matched in content and
appearance, were formed. The photographs
were about 800 pixels high526 wide, and they
were projected onto computer screens set at a
resolution of 1024768 pixels. We created two
versions of each photograph. The study item
consisted of the small part of an image that could
be seen between two central white concentric
circles drawn inside two squares of 166166 and
107107 pixels, respectively (see Figure 1A).
The remaining area of the photograph was
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masked in white. Given the small depicted area
of each picture, the viewable area was hardly
recognisable. A second version of the picture,
which would be used as context in some condi-
tions, was created in which the visible area was
reversed and the item was masked (see Figure 1B
and 1C). From each list 34 pictures were assigned
to the study condition, with the first and last two
not being tested. The remaining pictures within
each set were assigned to the recognition test.
List order and type were counterbalanced across
participants.
Study and test lists were randomised individu-
ally for each participant and presented using
e-prime software for experimental control
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).
Design and procedure. The experiment con-
sisted of two studytest cycles in which a list of
items was presented for study and then mixed
with a new set for a recognition test. The same
process was repeated with a second list. There
were three different between-subjects’ conditions
differentiated by the type of context presented at
study. In the congruent condition, the masked
part of the study image was presented for
3 seconds (Figure 1B), followed 100 ms later by
the study item for 2 seconds (Figure 1A). The
two complementary images never coexisted.
In the incongruent condition, the context
(Figure 1C) was unrelated to the study item
(Figure 1A) and came from a different picture.
In the third condition no context was presented,
being replaced by solid white (Figure 1D),
followed by the study item (Figure 1A). The
incongruent contexts were extracted from the
‘‘new’’ items to be presented at test. The inter-
trial interval was 1 second, during which the
screen went blank. The recognition test consisted
of the presentation of the 30 studied items mixed
with 30 new ones. Participants were asked to
recognise the test item on a 6-point confidence
scale, from very confident that it was presented,
to very confident that it was not. The keys
corresponding to the letters D, E, G, H, J, and
K were labelled for that purpose. Participants
were further instructed to report their state
of awareness in case of positive recognition
(instructions modelled according to Rajaram,
1996). A remember response was defined as
when recognition was accompanied by specific
details experienced at the item’s occurrence,
including the specific context presented. A
know response was defined as when one has
the feeling that the item was presented, but was
unable to bring to mind any specific details
about its occurrence in the list. The know and
remember responses were assigned to the V and
B keys on the computer keyboard.
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli presented in Experiments 1 and 2: The study item common to all conditions (A), and the congruent
(B), incongruent (C), and context absent (D) manipulation. Original in colour.
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Results and discussion
In the Appendix we reproduce the raw data by
confidence and condition for the three experi-
ments reported here. The recognition scores for
Experiment 1 are summarised in Table 1, which
shows the mean proportions of responses sepa-
rately by conscious state, as well as the discrimi-
nation indices. The significance level for all the
statistical tests was pB.05, unless otherwise
noted. As the interaction between the list and
the remaining variables was not significant, we
dropped it from further analyses and simply
combined the data from both lists.
Discrimination and rememberknow data.
There were different levels of hits depending on
the context condition (see Table 1), F(2, 93)
27.21, MSE0.01, pB.01. Newman-Keuls
tests showed that the congruent context produced
the highest level of performance, followed by
the no context condition, and leaving the incon-
gruent context condition in last position. This
difference in performance was reflected in the
remember judgements, F(2, 93)18.71, MSE
0.02, pB.01, which, in the congruent context
condition, were superior to the rest on the New-
man-Keuls tests. In contrast, the differences on
know hits were marginally significant, F(2, 93)
2.48, MSE0.01, p.09. Context manipula-
tion produced an effect on d ?, F(2, 93)29.82,
MSE0.33, pB.01. All contrasts were signifi-
cantly different as shown by the Newman-Keuls
tests. The false alarm rates showed an opposite
pattern, F(2, 93)15.41, MSE0.02, pB.01,
with the incongruent context producing the high-
est false alarm rates on the Newman-Keuls test.
The very same pattern of results was observed in
the analysis of remember false alarms, F(2, 93)
10.76, MSE0.02, p.01. In ‘‘know’’ false
alarms, F(2, 93)5.68, MSE0.01, p.01, only
the incongruent differed from the no context
condition.
Remember responses were made with higher
confidence than know responses in the three
conditions: t(31) 4.68, t(31) 17.80, and
t(31)9.31, pB.01, for the absent, congruent,
and incongruent conditions, respectively. Simi-
larly, the remember false alarms were also made
with higher confidence than know false alarms,
t(31)2.79, t(31)6.35, and t(31)8.32, pB .01,
respectively, as well as the remember false alarms
in relation to know hits, but only for the congruent
and incongruent conditions, t(31)6.91, t(31)
5.76, pB .01, respectively. There was a positive
correlation between the know hit and know false
alarm rates across participants (r.44, pB.01).
ROC and z-ROC analyses. Table 2 presents the
parameters obtained in the transformation of the
group’s ratings into ROCs and z -ROCs by least
square fitting. Figure 2 presents the plot of the
ROCs and z -ROCs data for the three experi-
ments. The three ROC quadratic constants
differed from zero, t(31)5.78, pB.01 (no con-
text); t(31)4.68, pB.01 (congruent); t(31)
5.11, pB.01 (incongruent), indicating that the
three curves were convex. The z -ROC quadratic
constants (see Table 2) of the no context and
incongruent conditions were significantly differ-
ent from zero, t(31)3.07, pB.01, and t(31)
TABLE 1
Mean proportions (and standard errors) for recognition as a
function of context condition for Experiment 1
Remember Know
Context Hits
False
Alarms Hits
False
Alarms d?
Absent .46 (.03) .07 (.01) .22 (.02) .10 (.01) 1.45 (.08)
Congruent .64 (.02) .06 (.01) .17 (.02) .15 (.02) 1.77 (.10)
Incongruent .41 (.03) .19 (.03) .21 (.02) .18 (.02) 0.69 (.12)
TABLE 2
Statistics (mean and standard error) for the ROCs, z-ROCs of Experiment 1
ROC z -ROC
Context quadratic constant R2 linear slope R2 quadratic constant R2
Absent 1.53 (0.27) .975 0.72 (0.03) .987 0.08 (0.02) .997
Congruent 1.61 (0.34) .963 0.78 (0.08) .996 0.05 (0.06) .998
Incongruent 0.53 (0.10) .999 0.91 (0.07) .995 0.10 (0.04) .999
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2.36, p.025, respectively. Power for detecting
a ‘‘medium’’ effect size (0.5 standard deviation;
Cohen, 1988) in the congruent condition was 0.63.
These results, when significant, indicated that the
functions were concave. In contrast, the z -ROC
quadratic constant of the related condition was
not different from zero, tB1. With regard to the
z-ROC linear slopes, the absent as well as the
congruent conditions differed from 1, t(31)
10.24, pB.01; t(31)2.95, pB.01, whereas the
incongruent one did not, t(31)1.27.
As indicated in the introduction, we also
computed the two-points z -ROC slopes esti-
mated from the rememberknow judgements, to
be able to compare them with the z -ROC slopes
estimated from the whole set of data. This
computation is carried out by subtracting normal-
ised remember hits from overall hits, and dividing
by the corresponding difference in normalised
false alarms (see Rotello et al., 2004, p. 590). This
computation was carried out on the global data,
given the large number of divisions by zero when
the individual data were taken for the analysis.
The z-ROCr values were 1.09, 0.70, and 0.97
versus z-ROC values of 0.72, 0.70, and 0.961 for
the control, congruent, and incongruent condi-
tions respectively.
This first experiment indicates that subjective
judgements can, under normal conditions, be very
susceptible to systematic contextual manipula-
tions and not only to bias (as in Rotello et al.,
2005). As expected, remember responses were
highest in the congruent condition followed by
the no context and incongruent conditions. This is
a very systematic proof that people are using
mental evidence to identify the test item as
studied or not. A similar argument can be made
with regard to the know responses. Note that the
evidence categorised as ‘‘know’’ by people in the
‘‘congruent’’ condition is almost nil (.17 hits
versus .15 false alarms) in contrast to the remain-
ing two conditions, as expected given the decreas-
ing saliency of the context in the ‘‘absent’’
condition and the misleading context in the
‘‘incongruent’’ one. The important question now
is whether those differences in discrimination can
be attributed to one or two sources of informa-
tion. We expected that the differences in the z-
ROC quadratic constants would be different from
zero first and foremost in the congruent, and
possibly in the ‘‘absent’’, manipulation because
we did not attempt to preclude completely the
possibility that the participants used their own
contextual events in retrieval (other contextual
details not manipulated by the experimenter).
A similar reasoning follows with regard to the
slopes computed from the z -ROCr and global
z -ROC confidence data. The data fit this general
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Figure 2. Receiver operating characteristics (top figures) and receiver operating characteristics plotted in standard scores (bottom
figures) for the different conditions of each experiment (left: Experiment 1; centre: Experiment 2; right: Experiment 3).
1 Note the similarity between these z -ROC values
estimated globally and the values estimated individually (see
Table 2).
484 ALGARABEL AND PITARQUE
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 03
:44
 28
 M
ay
 20
15
 
prediction except for the main condition; that is,
the ‘‘congruent’’ one. A possible explanation of
this discrepancy lies in the use of a very short time
interval between context and item presentation at
encoding, and the partial stimulus presentation at
test may have not encouraged the use of recollec-
tion enough because the whole stimulus could
pop out. A second aspect of the data is the high
standard error of estimation of that quadratic
constant (0.06), sometimes present in these types
of experiment given the difficulty of including
more stimuli for study. Following this reasoning,
we replicated the first experiment using a
longer-context item at study.
EXPERIMENT 2
Method
Participants. The participants were 64 psychol-
ogy student volunteers at the University of
Valencia (Spain) who participated for extra
course credit. They were allocated randomly
into two groups of 32 participants.
Materials and procedure. The materials and
procedure were identical to those used in Experi-
ment 1, except for the delay interval between the
context and the target stimuli. Instead of 100 ms,
this delay was set at 1000 ms. This value was a
compromise between the need to differentiate
both stimuli, and an acceptable level of recogni-
tion performance to be achieved on the basis of
the test stimuli.
Results and discussion. The recognition scores
for Experiment 2 are summarised in Table 3. In
the following analysis, the control group data of
the previous experiment were also introduced as
a baseline, given that both experiments are
identical except for the delay interval, which is
not defined in the control group.
Discrimination and rememberknow data.
There were different levels of hits depending on
the context condition (see Table 3), F(2, 93)
21.15, MSE0.01, pB.01. Newman-Keuls
tests showed that the incongruent context pro-
duced the lowest level of performance, whereas
no differences were found between the remaining
ones. The same pattern of results was found
analysing d ?, F(2, 93)5.48, MSE0.23, pB
.01, and the proportions of remember responses,
F(2, 93)15.65, MSE0.02, pB.01. No differ-
ence was found in the know category, F(2, 93)B1,
MSE0.01. With regard to false alarms, differ-
ences were found between conditions, F(2, 93)
21.52, MSE0.02, pB.01, with the unrelated
context producing the highest rates by Newman-
Keuls tests. The very same pattern of results was
obtained with remember false alarms, F(2, 93)
15.75, MSE0.01, pB.01. In case of know false
alarms, the control condition led to the lowest rate,
F(2, 93)7.08, MSE0.01, p.01.
Remember responses were made with higher
confidence than know responses both in the
congruent and incongruent conditions, t(31)
11.17, t(31)5.52, pB.01, respectively. Simi-
larly, the remember false alarms were also made
with higher confidence than know false alarms,
t(31)8.73, t(31)3.81, pB.01, respectively, as
well as the remember false alarms in relation
to know hits, t(31)4.58, t(31)3.09, pB.01,
respectively.
ROC and z-ROC analyses. The absent and
congruent ROC quadratic constants differed
from zero (see Table 4), t(31)5.78, pB.01,
t(31)9.08, pB.01, respectively, but not the
incongruent one, t(31)1.40, p .05. The
z-ROC quadratic constants of both congruent
and incongruent conditions did not differ from
zero, t(31)1.48, p.05, t(31)1.82, p.078,
respectively, although the absent condition did,
t(31)3.07, pB.01. Finally, all z -ROC linear
slopes differed from 1, t(31)10.24, pB.01;
t(31)11.54, pB.01, t(31)2.05, p.05.
The z -ROCr slopes were 0.72 and 0.98 and
0.64 and 0.86 when estimated from the remember
or confidence data, for the congruent and incon-
gruent conditions respectively. This discrepancy
may indicate that R responses cannot be taken
simply as higher-confidence responses, as the
signal detection model postulates.
TABLE 3
Mean proportions (and standard errors) for recognition as a
function of context condition for Experiment 2
Remember Know
Context Hits
False
Alarms Hits
False
Alarms d?
Absent .46 (.03) .07 (.01) .22 (.02) .10 (.01) 1.45 (.08)
Congruent .52 (.03) .05 (.01) .21 (.02) .15 (.02) 1.53 (.08)
Incongruent .32 (.02) .17 (.03) .23 (.02) .19 (.02) 0.52 (.10)
The control condition (Absent) data come from Experi-
ment 1.
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Despite a drop in accuracy from the first to
the second experiment, the parameters resulting
from the fits are very similar to those obtained
in the first one. In this experiment key para-
meters of the incongruent condition became
non-significant. Variability and lower accuracy
could explain this discrepancy. Given the varia-
bility of the previous results, we attempted to
simplify the design of the next experiment,
trying to achieve more stable statistical estimates
and increasing the number of data points on
which they are based. In the next experiment,
we present full size pictures for study, but at test
we will compare recognition based on a partial
original photograph, in comparison with a full
presentation. People in the partial view condi-
tion are expected to appeal to their memory
retrieval processes to a greater degree than those
in the full view condition.
EXPERIMENT 3
Method
There were 56 participants, randomly allocated
into two groups of 29 and 27. The method was
the same as in the previous two experiments,
except for the number of study lists and the test
conditions. There were three lists of 60 photo-
graphs each in which a set of 30 items were
chosen randomly for each participant. In this
experiment, each picture was presented for
300 ms three times in each study cycle, and
separated from the successive stimulus by a
100-ms black screen. The order of presentation
was randomly chosen. There were two condi-
tions at test. In the full picture condition
participants were presented with the complete
image that they saw at study, whereas in the
partial condition people saw only the 20%
central part (see Figure 3). The recognition test
proceeded as in the previous experiments. In
summary, participants studied three lists with 30
stimuli each presented for a total of 90 trials, and
received 60 test stimuli with each list (30 studied
plus 30 non-studied).
Results and discussion
The recognition scores are summarised in Table 5,
which shows the mean proportions of responses,
as well as the discrimination indices.
TABLE 4
Statistics (mean and standard error) for the ROCs of Experiment 2
ROC z -ROC
Context quadratic constant R2 linear slope R2 quadratic constant R2
Absent 1.53 (0.27) .975 0.72 (0.03) .987 0.08 (0.02) .997
Congruent 1.21 (0.13) .967 0.70 (0.03) .992 0.04 (0.02) .998
Incongruent 0.26 (0.18) .999 0.90 (0.05) .993 0.16 (0.09) .999
The control condition (Absent) data come from Experiment 1.
Figure 3. Examples of stimuli presented in Experiment 3: The study item common to all conditions (left), and the complete (left),
and partial picture (right) presented at test. Original in colour.
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Discrimination and rememberknow data. Full
picture recognition led to more hits and fewer false
alarms, t(54)2.29, p.026 versus t(54)7.45,
pB.01. No significant difference was found
in either remember or know hits, t(54)1.50,
p.14; tB 1, respectively. However, recognition
based on partial pictures produced more false
alarms in remember as well as know judgements,
t(54)4.51, pB.01; t(54)4.48, pB.01, respec-
tively. There was a significant difference in d ?,
t(54)10.30, pB.01, indicating logically that full
picture recognition was easier.
Remember responses were made with higher
confidence than know responses in both partial
and full conditions, t(28)8.75; t(26)5.11,
pB.01, respectively. Similarly, the remember
false alarms were also made with higher con-
fidence than know false alarms, t(28)6.77;
t(26)4.59, pB.01, respectively, as well as
the remember false alarms in relation to know
hits, t(28)5.49, pB.01; t(26)2.48, pB.05,
respectively. The correlation across participants
between the remember hit rate and the remember
false alarm rate was significant in the partial
condition (r .55, pB.01) but not in the full
condition (although it was positive, r.27).
However there was a positive correlation across
participants between know hits and know false
alarms considering both conditions together
(r.32, pB.05).
ROC and z-ROC analyses. The two ROC
quadratic constants differed from zero (see
Table 6), t(28)8.99, pB.01 (partial picture);
t(26)7.69, pB.01 (full picture), indicating that
the curves were convex. The z -ROC quadratic
constant of the partial picture condition was
significantly different from zero, t(28)2.10,
p.045, whereas the z-ROC quadratic constant
of the full picture condition was not (tB1). With
regard to the z -ROC linear slopes, both of them
differed from 1, t(28) 6.99, pB .01; t(26)
13.91, pB.01, for the partial and full picture
condition, respectively.
The z-ROCr slopes were 0.96 and 1.10 which
indicate that their values may be taken as
different from the values of 0.84 and 0.75
estimated from the confidence data, for the
partial and full picture conditions, respectively.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We designed the three experiments that we report
here with the idea of promoting differentially the
utilisation of contextual and/or item evidence in
the test phase of a recognition task. Our assump-
tion was that the use of both is not well balanced
in the typical recognition experiment published
in the literature, and is dependent on the experi-
mental conditions. Therefore this was a prerequi-
site to any further consideration of the virtues
of the rememberknow methodology as a tool
to shed light on the one- versus two-process
view of recognition. The first two experiments
had as a control a condition typically run in a
standard recognition experiment: just a series of
pictorial elements presented routinely for study.
We expected that participants would have little
TABLE 5
Mean proportions (and standard errors) for recognition as a function of context condition for Experiment 3
Remember Know
Condition Hits False Alarms Hits False Alarms d?
Partial picture .39 (.02) .17 (.02) .28 (.02) .25 (.02) 0.67 (.05)
Full picture .44 (.03) .06 (.01) .28 (.03) .12 (.02) 1.52 (.07)
TABLE 6
Statistics (mean and standard error) for the ROCs and z-ROCs of Experiment 3
ROC z -ROC
Condition quadratic constant R2 linear slope R2 quadratic constant R2
Partial 0.50 (0.06) .997 0.80 (0.03) .996 0.04 (0.02) .999
Full 1.68 (0.22) .973 0.75 (0.02) .998 0.01 (0.04) .998
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contextual evidence at test in comparison with the
remaining conditions. On the other hand, the
congruent and incongruent manipulations had
additional ‘‘contextual’’ information to facilitate
or interfere with the task of identifying the
correct stimuli. The third experiment tried to
achieve the same goal but this time presenting a
partial or full stimulus at test. In this case, and
beyond the differences in difficulty of both
conditions, we expected that participants would
use recollection more extensively in the partial
condition.
In the first two experiments, the raw data
indicated as expected that, in general, the level
of hits was greater in those conditions promoting
recollection of information positively related to
the target, but interfered (greater false alarms) in
those positively related to the lures (the incon-
gruent conditions). In the third experiment, given
that the ‘‘partial’’ condition was more difficult,
the percentage of hits was lower and the false
alarms greater than in the full picture condition.
Whereas in the first two experiments the informa-
tion provided by the item at test remained
constant across conditions and recollection varied
accordingly, in the third experiment we varied
both dimensions orthogonally. That is, when
people saw the whole picture at test, they had
maximum item and minimum recollective evi-
dence, whereas the opposite was true in the
partial view test.
Overall, the data suggest that people search
their memory for specific evidence related to the
current test image, trying to retrieve the rest of
the picture or any other contextual evidence to
confirm the test item as studied or not. The
strategy produced good relative results in the
congruent groups because it increased the pro-
portion of hits and led to a small and non-
significant increase in false alarms (perceived as
‘‘know’’) in comparison with the control group.
However, it produced the opposite results in the
incongruent group, increasing false alarms in
the remember and know response categories.
The interesting aspect of the data on the incon-
gruent group is that the participants explicitly and
implicitly falsely believed that some new items
never presented had been studied (remember
false alarms and know false alarms), respectively.
As part of this strategy, people in the congruent
group falsely accepted a given test item, as their
‘‘know’’ false alarm rates were also slightly
greater than the controls. In the present case,
the old and new lists are thematically matched,
and this factor may help to explain the slight
increase in false alarms in the congruent group.
These results are closely related to those obtained
in false recall research using words (Roediger &
McDermott, 1995) or pictures (Miller & Gazza-
niga, 1998) as stimuli. People are induced to
believe that new items have been presented on
the basis of their associative relation to previously
studied ones. Here we have a stronger case of
false recognition due to the multiple item and
context presentations and their very strong con-
nections. We believe, in agreement with Geraci
and McCabe (2006), that the source of this
increase in false alarms is not related to a specific
processing of the lures, but to the recollection of
contextual elements presented at study.
Recent experiments by Davenport and Potter
(2004) also support the previous interpretations.
They used natural scenes in which a background
and a foreground object were defined in a
consistent or inconsistent manner (e.g., a football
player or a priest against a stadium as a back-
ground). The results showed that after very brief
presentations (80 ms) people recognised the fore-
ground object more accurately when the context
was congruent (0.82 versus 0.68), but the pre-
sentation of the isolated object was more accurate
than its combination with a background of any
type. When asked to recognise both foreground
and background, the latter suffered and was less
accurate. Besides the parallelism, this experiment
points towards the predominant role that the item
has in any recognition experiment, and the small
role played by the recollective evidence (see also
Dobbins et al., 1998).
However, the first question of interest, given
the previous raw results, is whether those data
give any clues on the involvement of one or two
processes in recognition. Following the recent
arguments by Wixted and Stretch (2004) we will
discuss our results taking into account the rela-
tions between subjective responses (remember
know) and confidence, then the mirror effect,
and finally the receiver-operating characteristic
analysis.
Our experiments indicate that, across partici-
pants, confidence is greater for remember than
know responses, and for remember false alarms
than for know and know false alarms. Addition-
ally, there was a positive correlation between the
remember false alarm and know false rates across
the seven conditions (r.76, pB.05). The signal
detection view of the rememberknow task
interprets these relations as the result of criterion
488 ALGARABEL AND PITARQUE
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 03
:44
 28
 M
ay
 20
15
 
changes, and considers that the critical data for
past two-process interpretations has to do with
the significance of remember false alarms. In
most experiments, false alarms are discarded
because of their insignificance, or are considered
as guesses (as in Yonelinas’s model). How is it
possible to explain from this point of view that
remember false alarms are associated with
greater confidence than know hits? Obviously, if
false alarms are equated with guesses this is not
possible. Our view is that remember false alarms
are false recollections in which the important
aspect is more the recollection (illusory, see
Geraci & McCabe, 2006) of the study context,
than the processing of the lure itself. In our
experiments the increase in remember false
alarms as a function of the presentation of an
‘‘incongruent’’ context (Experiments 1 & 2) fits
this explanation. Further support is in the fact
that the only condition in which remember false
alarms are not associated with greater confidence
than know hits is the ‘‘absent’’ condition. This
‘‘absent’’ condition is defined as that in which the
item itself carries poor information (the annulae)
and no explicit ‘‘context’’ was presented.
In these experiments, as in many others in
which different discriminability conditions are
studied, a mirror effect is observed. That is, the
combination of higher hits and lower false alarm
rates in higher-discriminability in relation to
lower-discriminability conditions. But of more
interest is the possible presence of a remember
mirror effect. In terms of correlations, the
remember mirror effect is observed as a negative
correlation across conditions between remember
hits and false alarms rates (r.73, p.06 for
the conditions of the three experiments reported
here). The interpretation of the mirror effect
from the point of view of the signal detection
approach is linked to changes in criteria across
participants. When in an experiment liberal and
conservative participants are measured, a positive
correlation between hits and false alarms is
observed, but across conditions the opposite is
obtained because increases in d ? (changes in the
target distribution) are followed by changes in the
old/new criterion, leading to a simultaneous
increase in hits and decrease in false alarms.
Wixted and Stretch (2004) proposed a signal
detection explanation of the remember mirror
effect based in the simultaneous shift of the know
and remember criterion (see their figure 8,
p. 633). If remember responses are simply high-
confidence responses, a remember mirror effect
across conditions should be observed. Our data
show a remember mirror effect when a weak
condition is compared with a stronger one.
However, we would also expect a decrease in
know hits and know false alarms if a shift in
criterion is the correct explanation of the remem-
ber mirror effect. Although it is not a necessity to
assume that the know and remember criteria
move in a correlated fashion, from this assump-
tion follows naturally the simultaneous prediction
of a remember mirror effect and the decrease of
know hits and know false alarms when two
conditions of different strengths are compared
(positive correlation between know hits and false
alarms). We do not observe this result in our data:
a remember mirror effect but no decrease in
know hits, and/or increase in know false alarms
comparing the incongruent and absent, absent
and congruent (Experiment 1), and the partial
versus full picture (Experiment 3). The main
reason for this discrepancy seems to lie in the
interpretation of false alarms. If we think that the
study episode gives place to an increase in false
recollective evidence and/or familiarity, depend-
ing on conditions, on the lures then all these
results can be perfectly assimilated by a dual
model. Similar explanations have been advanced
by Diana et al. (2006) and by Geraci and McCabe
(2006) in relation to data obtained with different
paradigms.
With regard to the ROC analysis, the z -ROC
quadratic constants calculated in the first experi-
ment showed that the ‘‘no context’’ and the
‘‘incongruent’’ context were significantly differ-
ent from zero, whereas the ‘‘congruent’’ one was
not. This difference seems paradoxical. However,
the ‘‘no context’’ condition is similar to most
recognition experiments in which participants are
able to generate a mental context for each
presented stimulus. That is, people can form their
own images and connections, or gather other
evidence and recollect them later. We were able
to replicate these results in the second experi-
ment, after lengthening the interstimulus interval
to preclude the possible unitisation of context and
item. This conclusion was more firmly established
in the third experiment.
Previous experiments in item recognition using
similar analysis (Glanzer et al., 1999; Hilford
et al., 2002) have not found curvilinear z -ROCs
as predicted by dual models, although the evi-
dence is more arguable in associative recognition
(e.g., see Kelley & Wixted, 2001; Yonelinas, 1997).
In source recognition, experiments also show a
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mixture of results (Quamme, Frederick, Kroll,
Yonelinas, & Dobbins, 2002; Hilford et al., 2002)
that have led to a modification of the unequal
variance signal detection model to account for the
presence of curvilinear z -ROCs (but see Slotnick
& Dodson, 2004). It seems obvious to us that
there are situations or individual tests in which
only familiarity underlies the response, and others
in which there is a mixture of familiarity and
recollection. The case where recollection plays a
major role is less frequent in the experimental
literature. In our experiments, all constants
obtained by fitting a quadratic equation to the
ROC data differ from zero and are negative,
except for the incongruent condition of Experi-
ment 2, explainable because of the low accuracy.
This pattern of data indicates normality of the
underlying distributions of new and old items
(Hilford et al., 2002).
The z -ROC slopes showed a clear pattern with
values in the vicinity of .80, and approaching 1 as
a function of accuracy, as expected from the
previous literature (see also Glanzer, Adams,
Iverson, & Kim, 1993; Glanzer et al., 1999;
Heathcote, 2003; Hilford et al., 2002; Rotello
et al., 2004). As the accuracy decreased, so the
z-ROC slope approached 1. However in the third
experiment, even when accuracy was quite low,
still the z -slope was lower than 1. It is apparent
that the study episode is affecting the variances of
the old distribution, or the new one (in the
incongruent conditions). However, it is also
apparent that in some of the conditions of the
three experiments, recollection was absent, and
still the z -ROC slopes were considerable lower
than 1, and the z -ROC functions were linear, an
unacceptable combination for the Yonelinas
model. It has been remarked elsewhere (Heath-
cote, 2003) that the Yonelinas model could solve
this problem allowing unequal variances in the
signal detection component of the theory. How-
ever, given the continuity of remember and know
judgements (e.g., Perfect et al., 1996) we think
that a different dual model without the threshold
restriction would be more reasonable. Finally, the
slopes computed on the basis of the remember
confidence data can be taken as different from
those computed from the global confidence
judgements in the absent (Experiment 1), incon-
gruent (Experiment 2), and in the two conditions
of Experiment 3, possibly. Moreover, the correla-
tion across conditions for the three experiments
between both sets of slopes is 0.43 (p.05) and it
is considerably lower than the values calculated
by Wixted and Stretch (2004). This set of analyses
provides a different picture from that shown by
Wixted and Stretch (2004, Table 3, p. 626) in
their analysis of the published literature, indicat-
ing a greater discrepancy between both set of
estimations.
In the three experiments we have described,
we have forced participants to recollect evidence
and explicitly use it in recognition. These experi-
ments were run under what Rotello et al. (2005)
call ‘‘standard instructions’’. We have reached an
opposite conclusion to theirs in that, when given
appropriate opportunities to recollect, ROC
parameters and R/K judgements basically agree
(see also Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003; Prull,
Dawes, Martin III, Rossenberg, & Light, 2006).
In the two first experiments, the congruent
context is helping to achieve greater hit rates
than the controls at a slight cost of incrementing
false alarms. This increment in false alarms is
what to a greater extent is happening in the
incongruent condition in which there is a strong
cost in hits (decrease) and false alarms (in-
crease). The third experiment, from the point
of view of overall performance, shows that the
partial image presented at test made recognition
much more difficult. Nevertheless, recollection
helps to take a decision, as confirmed by the roc
analysis.
Although recent papers (e.g., Rotello et al.,
2005) have questioned the validity of the
rememberknow methodology in contrast to
previous claims by its proponents (Gardiner &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000), the overall conclu-
sion we obtain from our experiments is mostly
positive. There is little doubt that the procedure
may be subject to bias, meaning clearly that it is
not process pure, but given the appropriate
conditions it is responsive to the influence of
contextual variables of experimental interest and
in ways not so obvious from the objective
performance. For example, the fact that people
‘‘remember’’ at times and at some others falsely
‘‘know’’ an item as presented is something only
foreseen when this type of response is taken into
account, in a similar way to when people are not
able to verbalise any contingency but an effect on
recognition is found (Manier, Apetroiaia, Pappas,
& Hirst, 2004).
In conclusion, our experiments have been
designed to allow measurement of recognition
in a variety of changing conditions, requiring
different levels of recollection of the study
episode. We have collected confidence and
490 ALGARABEL AND PITARQUE
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 03
:44
 28
 M
ay
 20
15
 
rememberknow responses that have been ana-
lysed thoroughly to discern whether one or two
process views help to explain them better. We
think that no single position is able to account
uniquely for all aspects of the results. In fact, an
explanation can be deduced from each position
that is able to deal with most of the data.
However, we tend to favour a two-process
explanation if we add to the behavioural analysis
the conclusions we can extract looking at the
neurophysiological and neuropsychological litera-
ture. We mentioned in the introduction that the
neurophysiological literature is more in agree-
ment with the idea that there are two brain areas
involved in recognition (for a recent review see
Aggleton & Brown, 2006). The event-related
potentials studies (ERP) and the neuroimaging
literature (see a relevant exception to this general
conclusion in Gold et al., 2006) seem to indicate
that the hippocampus is mainly involved in
recollection, whereas several surrounding areas
like the perirhinal and other parahippocampal
structures are possibly involved in familiarity, in
addition to the involvement of the prefrontal
cortex. In this area of research, the remember
know paradigm is routinely used to index famil-
iarity and recollection and linked to different
pattern of neural activity in the brain (e.g.,
Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, Hayward, &
Knight, 2004). Finally, the neuropsychological
and ageing literature also provides support to
the two-process position. Older people (Bastin &
Van der Linden, 2003; Howard, Bessette-Symons,
Zhang, & Hoyer, 2006) show impairment in more
recollective-oriented recognition tests (yesno
tests) than in familiarity (forced choice). Finally,
patients diagnosed with mild cognitive impair-
ment, a prodromal stage of Alzheimer’s disease,
show intact or very mild impairment in familiarity
estimates but strong deficits in recollection,
although Alzheimer patients show strong deficits
in both components (Westenberg, Paller, Hold-
stock, Mayes, & Reber, 2006). In conclusion, we
think that, globally considered, the evidence
favours a dual-process view of recognition, in
which both processes can be behaviourally and
neurophysiologically characterised, which the
human cognitive system uses differently accord-
ing to encoding and testing conditions.
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Frequency of responses per confidence (from sure
old, 1, to sure new, 6) and experimental condition
for Experiment 1
Confidence
Context 1 2 3 4 5 6
Absent
Old 826 285 201 167 355 86
New 48 125 161 304 767 515
Congruent
Old 1053 298 196 140 180 52
New 54 138 207 347 663 511
Incongruent
Old 623 351 219 248 395 84
New 202 266 245 287 624 294
Frequency of responses per conﬁdence (from sure
old, 1, to sure new, 6) and experimental condition
for Experiment 2
Confidence
Context 1 2 3 4 5 6
Congruent
Old 876 315 216 183 247 82
New 40 153 202 425 680 419
Incongruent
Old 522 275 254 287 427 153
New 165 242 290 324 590 309
Frequency of responses per conﬁdence (from sure
old, 1, to sure new, 6) and experimental condition
for Experiment 3
Confidence
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6
Partial
Old 783 441 506 466 356 58
New 195 342 549 755 611 158
Full
Old 1115 351 286 235 303 140
New 100 136 223 409 790 772
APPENDIX
494 ALGARABEL AND PITARQUE
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 V
ale
nc
ia]
 at
 03
:44
 28
 M
ay
 20
15
 
